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Bosnia and Herzegovina Twenty Years after Dayton 
-Complexity Born of Paradoxes-  
Soeren Keil and Anastasiia Kudlenko 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper will start with an analysis of the Dayton Peace Agreement, and assess to what extent it 
focused on peace-building, state-reconstruction and democratization. It will provide an overview of 
major peace-building, state-reconstruction and democratization initiatives by international and local 
actors in post-war Bosnia. Following the often-presented argument that “Dayton is a good peace 
agreement but a bad blueprint for a democratic state,” the paper will ask if the Dayton Peace 
Agreement has failed in the consolidation of Bosnian statehood and the democratization of the 
country. In order to do this, an in-depth analysis of the current situation in terms of state consolidation 
and democratization will be given.  
The main argument of the paper demonstrates that while the Dayton Agreement had some inherent 
weaknesses, actions by local elites and international state-builders also explain some of the current 
issues of the Bosnian state.  
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 Introduction 
 
In December 1995, the Presidents of Bosnia and Herzegovina,1 Croatia and the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) signed the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (BiH) in Paris. This Agreement, often shortened to “Dayton Peace Agreement” (DPA)2 
because it was negotiated and finalized in Dayton, Ohio (USA) in November 1995, not only ended the 
three and a half year-long war in Bosnia, but it also re-organised the relations between these three 
countries and completed the first phase of the dissolution of Yugoslavia.3  
We assess the DPA according to three dimensions, namely peace-building, state-
reconstruction / state-building, and democratization. Peace-building has often been seen as the biggest 
success story of the Dayton Agreement. As this paper will highlight, this success was possible, 
because international actors were committed not only to provide a framework in which peace-building 
could take place, but they also were willing to provide resources and use their own troops to ensure 
that violence would not break out again in Bosnia after 1995. Further, Annex IV of the Agreement, 
called “Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina” provides a legal framework for the reconstruction of 
the Bosnian state. Establishing what is one of the most complex political systems in the world, this 
Annex, together with other Annexes that focus on refugee return and human rights, demonstrates that 
those who wrote the Peace Agreement foresaw the re-establishment of a Bosnian state after the 
conflict.4  
A primary aim of the Dayton Peace Agreement was to establish a democratic state; hence 
democratization is one of the major objectives of the DPA.5 The argument presented is twofold. We 
will highlight that the DPA has been overly ambitious about post-war Bosnia and provided complex 
and indeed unrealistic targets for state-building and democratization in particular, without including 
provisions or the flexibility to achieve these targets. Especially when looking at Bosnia in 1995 – a 
divided country with multiple armies on its territory, a ruined economy and no functional political 
institutions – it will become visible how some of the rather “idealistic” targets of the DPA were 
always at best challenging and at worst impossible to achieve. In addition, we will highlight how 
some of these targets clashed and contradicted each other, so that multiple interpretations of the DPA 
and its intentions were possible, which have contributed to a lack of progress and continued political 
disagreement. At the same time, the achievement of these goals was in the hand of local and 
international actors, who have worked hard to achieve some goals (for example the international focus 
on peace-building), while they have failed to put their full weight behind others (for example in terms 
of ensuring deep-rooted democratization). This goes back to an inherent paradox in the Dayton 
framework that became obvious in the post-war period – it is not clear who is responsible for the 
implementation of the Agreement. While the Constitution empowers local actors, international 
involvement has consistently increased after 1997 (until 2005, when international involvement 
substantially decreased), so that by the early 2000s the implementation of the civilian and military 
aspects of the DPA was mainly driven by international actors.  
In order to assess the DPA, this paper will progress in three main steps. The first part will 
focus on Dayton’s biggest success story – peace-building. The second part looks at Dayton’s ability of 
state reconstruction and state-building. While Bosnia has remained as one united country until today 
(and in many respects, this is already a success), there are many who are critical of Dayton’s ability to 
establish a functional state and make its political institutions work. The final part of the paper will 
look at Dayton’s impact on the democratization of post-war Bosnia. While the Dayton Agreement 
made it very clear that the post-war state was to be democratic and included numerous sections that 
focused on human rights, minority rights and power-sharing democracy, in reality Bosnia remains an 
electoral democracy at best.  
 
The DPA as an Instrument of Peace-Building 
 
It has been widely acknowledged that the primary goal of the DPA was to stop violence and 
put an end to the war,6 thus paving the way for a stable and durable peace not only in Bosnia, but also 
in the wider Balkan region. Despite a variety of literature published on the topic of peace-building in 
Bosnia after Dayton,7 it should be noted that the type of peace the Dayton Accord set out to establish 
has not yet been researched in depth. One of the deficiencies present in the study of peace-building 
clauses of the DPA is connected with a lack of theoretical considerations on the matter.  
The term ‘peace-building’ was introduced into the scholarly literature by the pioneer of peace 
studies Johan Galtung.8 In his seminal work ‘Three Approaches to Peace’ (1976) he differentiated 
between peace-making, peace-keeping and peace-building as three main types of third-party 
interventions into conflicts. He defined peace-making as a process of negotiations between decision-
makers aimed at settling or resolving specific conflicts, peace-keeping as a type of intervention to 
keep warring parties apart and ensure the absence of violence, while peace-building was seen as an 
effort to create peace, based on justice, equity and cooperation, in a post-conflict society, which also 
had to address the root causes of conflict in order to prevent its recurrence in the future.9 This 
typology has been devised to complement Galtung’s vision of peace, which has influenced the work 
of many researchers in peace and conflict studies.10 According to this vision, peace can be either 
negative or positive. Negative peace refers to the absence of direct violence, whereas positive peace 
means the presence of harmonious relations between different actors.11 Peace-building, therefore, 
seeks to establish positive peace, which is closely connected with reconciliation and healing.12 The 
overall idea of positive peace is to remove the structural sources of violence, to enable harmonious 
relations without continued fear, danger and the potential for a quick escalation and return to violence. 
As will be shown below, the Dayton Accord contains requirements for both types of peace with a 
focus on the positive one, yet gives much clearer instructions for achieving the negative one.  
An important contribution into the development of peace research has also been made by John 
Paul Lederach, who similarly to Galtung argued that the concept of peace-building cannot be reduced 
to post-conflict reconstruction. According to him, peace-building is 
a comprehensive concept that encompasses, generates, and sustains the full array of processes, 
approaches, and stages needed to transform conflict toward more sustainable, peaceful relationships. 
The term thus involves a wide range of activities that both precede and follow formal peace accords. 
Metaphorically, peace is seen not merely as a stage in time or a condition. It is a dynamic construct.13  
Within the UN, the term peace-building was first mentioned in the landmark report An 
Agenda for Peace (1992). The report defined peace-building as ‘action to identify and support 
structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict’.14 In 
1995 An Agenda for Development extended the concept by relating it to economic, social and cultural 
development.15 The UN’s understanding of peace-building has been continuously evolving ever 
since.16 In 2000 the Brahimi report emphasised that the use of peace-building should not be restricted 
to the post-conflict phase, and defined it as ‘activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to 
reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations 
something that is more than just the absence of war’.17 The United Nations has also identified three 
essential features of peace-building, which can be used to assess the DPA’s success in building peace 
in Bosnia. These features include: national ownership, national capacity and common strategy.  
The different definitions of peace-building used by Galtung and the UN point towards a 
normative/empirical imbalance in the discourses on peace-building. While the UN focuses much more 
on practical guidelines for the establishment of long-term peace, Galtung’s more normative distinction 
between positive and negative peace has become important for peace-builders who want to go further 
than just ending direct physical violence, and think about ways in which the structural sources of 
conflict can be addressed. Hence, this paper will consider both definitions.  
 
Peace-building in and after Dayton: From Negative to Positive Peace 
 
The DPA has highlighted military and civilian aspects for achieving peace in Bosnia, which 
share some of the characteristics of the negative–positive peace dichotomy, described above18. The 
violent nature of war and its devastating human cost (over 100, 000 killed and two million displaced 
internally and externally) have prompted peace negotiators to place clauses aimed at ending violence 
at the forefront of their agenda. As a result, military aspects of the peace settlement have been defined 
in Annexes IA, IB and II, while civilian implementation of peace was discussed in Annex X.19 Apart 
from been given a more central place, military clauses were also better developed, more detailed and, 
in some cases, even better guaranteed. Thus, the Agreement on Military Aspects of the Peace 
Settlement (Annex IA) and the Agreement on the Inter-Entity Boundary Line and Related Issues 
(Annex II) were also guaranteed by Croatia and Yugoslavia.20 Such an endorsement of these two 
Annexes can be viewed as an illustration of the importance attached by the international community 
to the cessation of hostilities and direct violence in Bosnia, hence, it is no surprise that the military 
aspects can be found in the first two Annexes of the DPA.  
The task of implementing military clauses of the peace agreement was entrusted to the 
NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR). The Force had to guarantee the end of hostilities and 
separate the armed forces of the two Entities:21 the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and 
the Republika Srpska (RS).22 The military requirements also included the creation of a Zone of 
Separation along the agreed Inter-Entity Boundary Line, the collection of heavy weapons in 
cantonment areas and regional stabilization measures, such as cooperation within a Joint Military 
Commission.23 As a whole, the military clauses of the DPA consisted of measurable and clearly 
defined steps, aimed at stopping the conflict and preventing it from recurring, i.e. promoted the 
establishment of negative peace. These detailed military clauses highlight the importance of the DPA 
as a tool of transferring the cease fire that existed in Bosnia since summer 1995 into a permanent 
peace deal, which was guaranteed by a heavy international presence in the country. Up to 60,000 
NATO soldiers were deployed to ensure the end of hostilities, observe and control the disarmament, 
and after 1997 also engage more directly in the arrest of war criminals and support the agenda of 
civilian peace implementation.   
Yet, even the military aspects of the DPA were not without their contradictions. For example, 
disarmament and collection of heavy weapons were highlighted strongly in Annex IA and B of the 
DPA, yet, the Constitution of BiH, which can be found in Annex IV of the DPA, gave responsibility 
for military matters to the two Entities. After 1995 Bosnia therefore had de jure two armies (one for 
the FBiH and one for the RS). De facto, however, Bosniak and Croat troops were not fully united until 
a comprehensive military reform in 2005/6.24 Hence, this reveals the tension between addressing 
some of the structural sources of conflict in Bosnia, including building a more inclusive state, and the 
focus on the implementation of negative peace inherent in the DPA.  
By the end of June 1996 IFOR accomplished all of its principal military tasks: it stopped 
hostilities, separated the armed forces of the two Entities, oversaw the transfer of territory between 
them and moved the majority of the parties’ heavy weapons into secure sites.25 By the September 
1996 elections, NATO concluded that IFOR had successfully completed its mission, yet the instability 
on the ground prevented it from removing its forces from Bosnia completely. That is why in 
December 1996 a new smaller Stabilisation Force (SFOR) was deployed to BiH with the main aim to 
‘contribute to a safe and secure environment conductive to civil and political reconstruction.’26 Just 
like its predecessor IFOR and successor EUFOR Althea, SFOR operated under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter. It stayed in the country for eight years working on the deterrence and prevention of 
hostilities, promotion of a peaceful climate and provision of selective support to actors dealing with 
the civilian implementation of the peace settlement.27 In particular, SFOR was engaged in de-mining 
operations, arresting persons indicted for war crimes, assisting the return of refugees and supporting 
defence reforms.28  
The improved security situation in Bosnia allowed NATO to consistently reduce and re-
structure its forces: if initially it deployed 60,000 troops within IFOR, SFOR went down from 31,000 
personnel in 1996 to 7,000 in 2004. Slowly but surely, as a result of the NATO-led military effort, the 
main challenge in BiH became less about the cessation of direct violence between different ethnic 
groups, but more about ‘the diminution of factors threatening the security and hindering the further 
stabilisation and integration of BiH.’29 Hence, while NATO focused in the first post-war years on the 
creation of negative peace, after 1998 the attention shifted more directly to addressing the structural 
reasons for violence and conflict, and build a positive peace in post-war Bosnia. This change allowed 
NATO to hand over the responsibility for the military aspects of the DPA to the European Union 
(EU), whose operation EUFOR Althea was deployed to Bosnia in December 2004. The main 
objective of EUFOR has remained consistent with the mandates of IFOR and SFOR, and is to 
contribute to the safe and secure environment in BiH.30 Yet, following the opening of the membership 
perspective to the countries of the Balkan region at the Thessaloniki Council in 2003, EUFOR also 
assumed responsibility for assisting BiH on its path towards joining the EU. It, therefore, provides 
support to the overall EU strategy for Bosnia and offers capacity-building and training to Bosnia’s 
defence structures.31 At the same time, BiH has undergone a complex military reform in 2005 and 
2006, which was supported by the EU and NATO and was also part of Bosnia’s closer integration into 
NATO. At the core of the reform is the creation of a state defence ministry, which would combine the 
units of the FBiH and RS, and put them under the joint command of the Presidency.32  
Compared to the post-war years, the situation in BiH has changed dramatically: the two 
Entities coexist peacefully, there has been a decline in ethnically motivated violence and most 
importantly, there is a very low risk of the country descending into a full-blown war, although minor 
conflicts might still occur.33 What is more, thanks to the combined efforts of international and 
domestic actors, which collaborated through the Defence Reform Commission, the country now has a 
single Ministry of Defence and professional Armed Forces (AFBiH) – the goals seen as inconceivable 
in 1995.34 These changes alone prompt us to speak about the success of the military clauses of the 
DPA. It has kept peace in Bosnia for 20 years, which is an accomplishment hard to deny. Having said 
that, it is too early to speak about a full completion of the military peace-building tasks in BiH. Large 
quantities of arms and ammunition remain dispersed throughout BiH with thousands of tons of 
explosives waiting for destruction in cantonment sites.35 10,000-strong army forces are yet too 
financially weak and dependent on external actors to be able to take the responsibility for the 
protection of the country. In case of conflict, the military structures could also easily fall apart, due to 
their structure, which reflects the constitutional order in the country and thereby focuses on the 
representation of the three constituent peoples. Further, the ability of EUFOR at a present strength of 
600 troops to fulfil its mandate to contribute to a safe and secure environment in the country is rather 
questionable. Yet, Bosnia’s closer integration into the EU (the signing and implementation of a 
Stabilization and Association Agreement in 2008/2015) and NATO (Bosnia is a member of the 
Partnership for Peace since 2006 and was invited to join a Membership Action Plan in 2010) have 
also contributed to lowering the tensions and creating a more stable and peaceful environment. To 
sum up, though there is no question about the Bosnia of today being safer and more secure than in 
1995, 20 years after the war ended the country is not yet ready to assume responsibility for its own 
defence. Reform efforts in military policy have mainly been driven by international actors, most 
notably NATO, and it remains to be seen if these reforms will be deep-rooted enough to survive if a 
new conflict unfolds. 
The situation with the civilian aspects of the DPA is even more complicated. Civilian clauses 
in the agreement were less specific than the military ones, although not necessarily less ambitious. 
Annex X listed a wide range of activities, needed for achieving positive peace in BiH, among them: 
‘continuation of the humanitarian aid effort for as long as necessary; rehabilitation of infrastructure 
and economic reconstruction; the establishment of political and constitutional institutions in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina; promotion of respect for human rights and the return of displaced persons and 
refugees; and the holding of free and fair elections.’36 The oversight of these tasks was given to a 
High Representative (HR) as the final authority in theatre regarding the interpretation and 
implementation of the civilian aspects of the peace settlement. The HR, however, was not the only 
actor in this field as the DPA envisioned ‘a considerable number of international organizations and 
agencies’ to assist the post-holder.37 Having defined a rather broad scope of civilian activities, the 
DPA did not offer a clear road map for approaching them.38 Instead, it outlined the mandate of the 
High Representative and general methods for coordinating peace-building efforts of various 
international actors involved in the process. Here we will only focus on two civilian aspects – the 
economic reconstruction of the country and return of refugees and internally displaced persons. This 
is to give more precision to the analysis and avoid repetition since most other civilian aspects of the 
peace settlement will be covered as part of our discussion on the state-building and democratization 
clauses of the DPA. 
Both post-war economic reconstruction and return of refugees have been integral components 
of peace agreements since the 1990s. The international community has seen them as steps, necessary 
for bringing war-torn countries back to normalcy as well as indicators of stability, reconciliation and 
well-being. By emphasising the need to re-build the economy and ensure the return of refugees, 
peace-builders have been working towards reducing the chances of backsliding into violence and 
improving the probability of harmonising relations in post-war environments. From the point of view 
of Galtung’s dichotomy these actions are aimed at positive peace, which, as stated above, goes 
beyond ending hostilities. By the same token, according to Lederach’s view the focus on economic 
reconstruction and reconciliation can also be understood as part and parcel of the process of building 
lasting peace. It needs to be highlighted furthermore that economic reconstruction and refugee return 
also link peace-building to state-building (an essential element of which is reconstructing a state’s 
infrastructure including its economy) and democratization. As will be discussed below, refugee return 
was essential in the DPA’s focus on democratization and promotion of human rights.    
The economic losses of Bosnia in the war were vast: the country’s GDP fell to less than $500 
per capita, which was around 20% of the pre-war level, the industrial production plummeted to 10-
30% and the majority of physical capital was destroyed.39 The total damage was estimated at $50-60 
billion or including indirect effects – $100 billion.40 Immediately after the war, international actors, 
including the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and European Bank of 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), just to name a few, agreed on the Priority Reconstruction 
and Recovery Programme for BiH with a budget of $5.1 billion.41 This money was mostly used for 
the reconstruction of the country’s infrastructure and housing, as well as the restoration of public 
services, e.g. education and health sectors. After 2000 the international community started allocating 
resources for different priorities, which were mainly aimed at supporting the country’s transition into 
a homogeneous economic entity. Thanks to this shift BiH has adopted some important reforms, in 
particular, on the unification of the customs service and the adoption of a single value-added-tax, 
covering the territory of the whole country.42  
The results of the economic reconstruction in general, however, have been rather modest. 
Bosnia today, though showing signs of economic recovery and even some slow growth (2% in 2015, 
which could increase to 4% in 201643), suffers from fragmentation and lacks a unified economic 
space.44 The country is dependent on international assistance and is far behind other European 
economies in terms of development and employment.45 The sheer number of external actors involved 
in the economic reconstruction of BiH, poor coordination between them and their almost complete 
disregard for the local capacities are among the factors explaining the lack of sustainability in 
Bosnia’s economy 20 years after Dayton. In addition, local actors, including political and business 
elites, have used the fragmented political space to develop their own patronage and clientelistic 
networks, which have also hindered wider economic development. Political decentralization has 
added additional layers of administration to those wanting to do business, and poor infrastructure and 
a lack of vocational training have also contributed to the fact, that Bosnia has not returned to the pre-
war economic situation and is still recovering from the war and the latest financial crisis.46 
The implementation of the DPA clauses on the return of refugees, similarly to military and 
economic clauses, had big significance for building peace in Bosnia. In 1995 nearly half of the BiH’s 
pre-war population was displaced: 1.2 million sought refuge abroad, while another million was 
displaced inside the country as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).47 The Dayton Agreement 
guaranteed ‘the right freely to return to their homes of origin’ to all refugees and displaced persons.48 
Refugee return also highlighted a moral commitment by international actors to undo at least some of 
the results of ethnic cleansing practices, which have been a symbol of the conflict in Bosnia, and have 
had a lasting impact. Initially the implementation of the return policy met the resistance of local 
authorities, but gained momentum after 1999 when the international community shifted the focus 
from the ‘politicised right to return to an individual right to property.’49 As a result of the Property 
Law Implementation Plan the restitution of property lost in war amounted to 95% already in 2005.50 
This, in its turn, had a positive impact on returns, which remained the main goal of the policy: they 
reached more than a million in 2008, out of which 467,297 constituted minority returns.51 Despite 
these remarkable statistics, the problem of refugees and IDPs has not been entirely solved: research 
shows that high restitution rates often mean house exchanges and sales, while those returns that do 
take place usually involve only a part of the family.52 Even more, minority returnees often experience 
discrimination in employment, access to public services and suffer from isolation. All this shows that 
the return policy has been only partially successful. 
In conclusion, we can say that the peace-building effort in BiH has brought about a wealth of 
positive results: the two Entities have clearly defined borders, the country has a professional army and 
unified Ministry of Defence, its infrastructure and public services destroyed by the war have been 
largely rebuilt, the economy is showing signs of recovery, more than million refugees and displaced 
persons returned to their pre-war homes, and, most importantly, peace has been holding for 20 years. 
Yet, if we assess the DPA’s peace-building clauses against the UN’s criteria of success our 
conclusions will be less positive. There is still a lack of national ownership when it comes to the 
security of the country: BiH is a semi-protectorate with the international community in charge of the 
military and civilian aspects of the DPA. The country remains dependent on international assistance, 
therefore, its national capacity is not yet sufficiently strong. Finally, the international community has 
failed to produce a common strategy for BiH which would be playing to the country’s strengths, while 
simultaneously coordinating the efforts of the myriad of external actors.  
While the military aspects of the DPA were detailed and framed clearly according to 
responsibility, aims and timing, much of the civilian aspects of peace-building were rather vaguely 
defined and the multitude of actors involved made their implementation often more difficult. In many 
respects, even in the area of peace-building, which is often highlighted as the most successful element 
of the DPA, it is possible to conclude that the Dayton framework was incomplete and sometimes even 
contradictory. 53  
 
State-Building and State-Reconstruction within the Dayton Framework 
 
It has widely been established in the academic literature that the DPA focused extensively on 
state-building and state-reconstruction.54 The already mentioned Annex IV of the DPA laid down the 
‘Constitution for Bosnia and Herzegovina’ while Annex III focused on elections, Annex VI specified 
human rights provisions and Annex VII highlighted the importance of refugee return. The discussion 
above also mentioned that Annex X laid down the role of a HR as the civilian oversight mechanism to 
ensure the implementation of these Annexes. In Bosnia, post-war state-reconstruction was a new form 
of state-building. The post-Dayton Bosnian state had little in common with its predecessor, which 
became independent in April 1992. First, the name changed to “Bosnia and Herzegovina”, losing 
“The Republic of” in the process. Second, the structures of the post-war state were very different if 
compared to the state that became independent in 1992. Finally, the political environment had 
changed substantially. While the same parties dominated Bosnia before and after the war, the 
landscape had massively changed. Ethnic cleansing and the destruction of the war had created a new 
political, economic and social reality in Bosnia, in which most territories were ethnically 
homogenous.55 The vast amount of destruction made transportation throughout the country in 1995 
virtually impossible, while the new rulers over these homogenous territories had little interest in 
welcoming refugees from other ethnic groups back. Economic and political elites, many of whom 
profited from the war through the war economy, were now rulers over homogenized territories, in 
which they did not only control the population, but also the media, the economy, social benefits, state 
investment, and public administration.56 The clientelistic networks and patronage systems forged 
during and shortly after the war would remain in place throughout the last 20 years, and would have a 
massive impact, not only on state-building and reconstruction, but also on democratization and the 
success of external intervention in post-war Bosnia.      
While state-reconstruction has been widely discussed as a key element of the DPA, little 
attention has been drawn to the fact, that Dayton is not clear on what kind of state it foresees. The 
weak political structures of the Republic of BiH were replaced with complex provisions, outlining that  
 
The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the official name of which shall henceforth be "Bosnia and 
Herzegovina," shall continue its legal existence under international law as a state, with its internal 
structure modified as provided herein and with its present internationally recognized borders.57 
 
The Constitution, together with more academic research on Bosnia’s constitutional framework 
allow for its classification as a multinational federal state, based on consociational power-sharing 
between the main ethnic groups – Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats.58 Institutions such as the House of 
Peoples, which consists of five Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats, and the three-member Presidency (one 
Bosniak, one Serb and one Croat) demonstrate this dominance of the main ethnic groups, which the 
Constitution labels as ‘constituent peoples’. This strict power-sharing is coupled with a high degree of 
decentralization, major tasks including tax collection, policing, economic planning and military 
provisions were given to the two Entities. Since ethnic cleansing had resulted in largely ethnically 
homogenous territories in Bosnia after the war (the RS and the cantons in the FBiH), this means that 
each of the ethnic groups also enjoys a vast amount of autonomy in the territory in which they are a 
majority.59 Such a model of state-reconstruction after civil wars has long been promoted by members 
of the consociational school, who argue that elite cooperation and group autonomy are key for making 
ethnically divided societies work.60 Bosnia’s constitutional framework laid the foundation of a strict 
consociational model, yet, it also emphasized elements such as human rights and refugee return. As 
Jens Woelk has argued, this demonstrates one of the most important paradoxes in the DPA, that it 
connects multinational power-sharing democracy with refugee return and human rights. If all refugees 
would have returned, this would have undermined the main basis of consociational power-sharing – 
ethnically homogenous territories in which elites can represent the dominant ethnic groups.61  
 This contrast between strict power-sharing and human rights promotion can be found 
throughout the DPA and in the Constitution as well, where Article II lays down a long list of human 
and fundamental rights, while Articles III-V provide the framework of an ethnic power-sharing 
system. The Dayton framework, in other words, provides a paradoxical blueprint for state-
reconstruction. Different interpretations are possible, including those that see the state as a union of 
two Entities, of three constituent peoples, or as a component and pact of all its people who are 
protected by core human and fundamental rights. This is further worrying, as these different 
interpretations have been dominant in post-war Bosnia’s political discourse, as will be demonstrated 
below. It could be argued that such a framework was necessary in order to get all parties to agree to 
the DPA. Bosnian Serb leaders would have failed to agree to and implement the Agreement if their 
Entity was not recognized, while Bosniak elites focused on the territorial unity of Bosnia in which 
each citizen is treated the same way. Furthermore the strong emphasis on democratization with early 
elections was designed to give Bosnian elites ownership over the future development of their state. 
Yet, because no blueprint for what kind of state Bosnia was given in the DPA, this ownership 
principle was severely limited and remains so until today. The DPA provides a framework for a 
paradoxical state, which focuses on consociational power-sharing and mechanisms to overcome the 
dominance of ethnicity at the same time.  
 
External State-Building and International Intervention in post-Dayton Bosnia 
 
Because of the fundamental paradoxical nature of the DPA, and the lack of international 
involvement and pressure, state-reconstruction and state-building efforts lagged well behind some of 
the successes of the military elements of the DPA. Indeed, in the immediate post-war period, Bosnian 
elites could not even decide where to meet, let alone agree on major reforms. Issues such as a law on 
citizenship, a political framework for the reconstruction of the country, support for the freedom of 
movement, and government support for refugees and internally displaced persons were not addressed 
because elites representing the three constituent peoples were unable to find any agreement. Instead, 
Bosnian Serbs focused on the integration of the RS into Serbia, while the Bosnian Croats, with the 
support of Franjo Tuđman’s Croatia, also emphasized the integration of ‘their’ territory into Croatia. 
The FBiH was not working properly internally, and the RS refused to work with central state 
institutions, it did not send representatives to joint institutions and did not contribute in any way to 
measures that would strengthen the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina.62
 While Dayton ensured the 
territorial integrity of Bosnia and provided a complex political framework to hold it together, in the 
first post-war years, different local elites used Dayton and the weakness of international state-builders 
to continue the policy of dismantling and ethnically homogenising the state’s territory.63    
As a result of this failure by local elites to implement important elements of the DPA in 
relation to state-building, and participate actively in a political process, international actors enhanced 
the power of the High Representative in 1997 to include the ability to impose laws, to suspend and 
amend existing and proposed laws and to ‘take actions against persons holding public office […] or 
who are found by the High Representative to be in violation of legal commitments made under the 
Peace Agreement or the terms of its implementation.’64 These, so called Bonn Powers resulted in the 
HR becoming the most important political actor in post-war Bosnia, implementing a variety of laws, 
including on Bosnian citizenship, customs and taxation, border control and security issues, state 
symbols, and constitutional changes to the Entity constitutions. Bosnia became ‘a state of 
international design that exists by international design.’65 Most HR interventions aimed at 
strengthening the central state and weakening the Entities. This state-strengthening exercise was a 
result of the realization that Dayton created a state that was too weak to exist without external support 
and needed to be strengthened in order to ensure peace, democratic governance and reform progress. 
This form of external state-building has demonstrated some important success stories, including a 
more inclusive political environment, the departure of many people indicted either for war crimes or 
corruption from politics and public administration, and a visible strengthening of the state, which also 
encouraged Bosnian Serbs and Croats to participate more regularly in central state matters and be 
represented in its institutions. Indeed, as Florian Bieber has highlighted, Dayton proved to be more 
flexible in terms of state-building and reconstruction than many would have suggested.66 Yet, 
international intervention through HR impositions also undermined the power-sharing structure and 
political decision-making framework that Dayton provided – and has resulted in a lack of political 
consensus and compromise building among Bosnian elites, and has raised serious questions about the 
legitimacy of the international state-building operation.67 The international engagement ended with 
High Representative Paddy Ashdown, as his successor Christian Schwarz-Schilling was told to 
prepare the country for the closure of the Office of the High Representative. For many in the 
international community, 2006 was the right time to complete the international state-building and 
reconstruction mission, assuming that the Bosnian state was strengthened enough to survive by itself 
and that the EU integration process would drive further reforms.68 
 Yet, what happened since 2006 is that neither international actors nor local elites have been 
able to uphold the reform agenda in Bosnia. The incentive of EU integration has not been strong 
enough to push local elites towards consensus and cooperation. Instead, a failed constitutional reform 
in April 2006 has highlighted how different the visions on Bosnia’s future are. While Bosniak elites 
strongly pushed for a more centralized state, Serb and Croat elites feared for the autonomy of 
territories under their control. Milorad Dodik, the president of the RS, has threatened to call for a 
referendum on the Entity’s secession in order to block any further progress that he sees as weakening 
his Entity.69 Bosnian Croats have recently become more vocal, arguing that they are being 
discriminated within the FBiH, and also demand their own territorial unit.70 What all of this highlights 
is a lack of common state vision that goes back to the above described paradoxes of the DPA. 
Furthermore, BiH has been stuck between a rock and a hard place since 2006, with local elites 
unwilling to implement important reforms in relation to Bosnia’s EU integration progress, and 
international actors unable to intervene again as a result of disagreement between major international 
players. In an environment like this, in which local institutions and elites are incapable and unwilling 
to come to joint decisions and address major policy issues such as environmental legislation, 
agricultural reform, citizenship and registration issues, and cultural funding, Bosnia has indeed 
become a state impossible to build.71 There is no consensus within Bosnia on the common state and 
where to go, and there is no consensus among major international actors on the future of the Bosnian 
state and the best way forward. 
 The DPA did not provide a blueprint for a functional state. Instead, it outlined a general 
framework for some institutions, and many of its core elements were contradictory and paradoxical. 
As a result of this, no progress in terms of state-reconstruction was achieved in the first post-war 
years, until international actors intervened in 1997. While some progress was achieved between 1997 
and 2006, since then the country has been stagnating and falling behind others in the region, not least 
in terms of EU integration. Yet, Dayton alone is not to blame for this situation. Neither local elites nor 
international state-builders have been able to provide a common vision of what Bosnia is as a state 
and how its three main peoples can live together and work together to achieve EU membership (which 
is widely accepted as the main goal for Bosnia’s future). Instead, there are still fundamental 
disagreements over what kind of state Bosnia is, and what role the three constituent peoples have in it.  
 
Dayton and Democratization 
 
The DPA was also rather explicit in relation to the democratization of the post-war Bosnian 
state. Article I.2 of the Constitution states that ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be a democratic state, 
which shall operate under the rule of law and with free and democratic elections.’72 Annex III 
(Elections) and VI (Human Rights) of the DPA also indicate the focus on democratization, and indeed 
a strong focus on democracy, which goes beyond free elections. Instead, both the Constitution and 
different Annexes highlight the importance of free media, refugee return, human rights, and the rule 
of law. In the words of Wolfgang Merkel, it is possible to conclude that the DPA foresaw a concept of 
democracy, which is embedded rather than minimalist.73 This form of democracy highlights the 
importance of free and fair elections, but also focuses on additional elements to ensure that democracy 
becomes consolidated and accepted by all major actors. These include the focus on the rule of law, 
free media, and the protection of fundamental human rights. Dayton clearly focused on these 
elements, many of which are mentioned either in the Constitution (for example free media, 
fundamental rights, human rights, rule of law) or in some of the DPA’s Annexes (Annex VI – Human 
Rights). As was the case with state-building and reconstruction, a key aim of democratization was to 
undo some of the results of the conflict in Bosnia (hence the focus on refugee return and human 
rights), to counter-balance the dominance of political elites representing exclusively the main ethnic 
groups (hence the focus on individual rather than group rights), and to provide a framework for the 
future development of the Bosnian state, which would enable reconciliation, and a move towards a 
less restrictive power-sharing system.  
 However, as has already been mentioned above, the institutional framework provided was 
characterized by complexities and paradoxes, especially the contrast between consociational power-
sharing on the one side, and the focus on individual and human rights and refugee return on the other 
side.74 While the DPA foresaw an embedded democracy in Bosnia, it is not clear what kind of 
democracy this would be. One interpretation is to say that major groups (i.e. the constituent peoples) 
would elect their elites who would cooperate and work together in post-war Bosnia. This 
interpretation is further supported by the strong focus on autonomy in the DPA, which gave the three 
constituent peoples a vast amount of autonomy over the territory in which they were the majority. 
However, another interpretation would be that Dayton, while protecting the rights of the constituent 
peoples, foresaw a liberal democracy, in which the human rights of all citizens would be central, 
independent of their ethnic belonging and place of residence. The focus on refugee return and on 
human rights would allow for this interpretation, which would result in a very different form of 
democracy in post-war Bosnia. The DPA is not clear which form of democracy it favours, but 
Bosnian elites have clearly opted for consociational power-sharing, because it consolidated and 
enhanced their power, not only over the territory where their group was a majority, but also over the 
central institutions of the Bosnian state.  
Furthermore, the democratization process in post-war Bosnia has also been at the centre of 
attention of many commentators. While many have criticized the interventions of the HR as a form of 
new colonialism,75 others have defended them as a form of controlled democracy, as the HR had to 
intervene when local elites failed to act.76 Be that as it may, clearly the involvement of international 
actors in post-war state-building and democratization in Bosnia needs to be analyzed critically 20 
years after the peace agreement was signed. As has been mentioned above, while the international 
intervention has contributed to strengthening the state and making the state more self-sustaining, it has 
also created new dependencies (Bosnian elites beginning to rely on the HR, even when they agreed on 
decisions),77 and more importantly, it limited the possibilities for consensus finding and the search for 
compromise amongst Bosnian elites. Power-sharing systems tend to work best when elites are willing 
to work together, respect each other’s point of view, and have been socialized into working together 
and finding suitable compromises that benefit all groups.78  This socialisation was undermined 
through the interventions of the HR in Bosnia. What is more, the HR has been unable to use his 
interventions to push Bosnia towards democratization. When the international community ended its 
heavy interventionist policy in 2006, progress stopped in Bosnia. The differences between the elites 
representing the constituent peoples are too big to overcome, there is little willingness to work 
together, and the main elites remain focused on their access to key resources and control over the 
territory in which their group is the majority.79 
20 years after Dayton, Bosnia remains an electoral democracy at best. Freedom House labels 
it as ‘partly free.’80 Neither is the media fully free, nor is the rule of law independent and functional 
throughout the country. The EU has failed to incite important reforms in the country, including 
judicial reform, police reform81 and media reform. Parties still function as large patronage networks 
that control a huge system of clientelistic interests, and therefore ensure their permanent access to 
votes and funding via representation in parliaments and governments. Dayton’s ambiguity in terms of 
what kind of democracy Bosnia should be, plus the inability of international actors to promote 
democratic reforms and system-internal democratization, and the unwillingness and resistance of local 
elites to promote democratization, have resulted in the lack of democratic progress in post-war 
Bosnia.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina has gone through a challenging transition in the last 20 years. The 
country had to consolidate its statehood, implement a functional democracy, and switch from the 
Yugoslav system of workers’ self-management to a liberal market economy. The war between 1992 
and 1995 has contributed to a delayed and even more complex transition period after 1995.  
 The DPA attempted to end the war in December 1995 and provide a blueprint for Bosnia’s 
future. With sections focusing on peace-building, state-building and democratization, it is fair to say 
that the DPA is one of the most detailed and complicated peace agreements in history. Yet, as the 
discussion above demonstrated, 20 years after the DPA, Bosnia remains a country stuck between 
complexity and paradoxes. While many elements of the peace-building framework that Dayton 
provided have been successfully implemented, the record is less impressive when looking at state-
building and democratization. Here, local resistance, the lack of a coherent strategy by international 
state-builders and the paradoxes inherent in the DPA have led to a lack of progress and encouraged 
stagnation. Until today it is not clear who is in charge of the democratization and state-building 
exercise in Bosnia – local elites (who are often resistant and unwilling to work together) or 
international actors (who have no democratic legitimacy and no clear overall strategy). Bosnia still 
lacks a coherent vision for the future of the country, and a common understanding over what kind of 
democracy Bosnia should be (and should implement) on its way to membership in the EU. European 
integration has not sparked the same reform efforts as seen in Central and Eastern Europe, but also in 
neighbouring Croatia – mainly because Bosnia remains a contested state, with unconsolidated 
statehood and a democratic framework that is limited to free and fair elections.  
It should come as no surprise that international actors abstained from using Dayton as a 
blueprint in similar situations. Neither the international state-building missions in Kosovo and 
Macedonia, nor the more complex democratization missions in Afghanistan and Iraq have used 
Dayton as an example of good practice.82 If anything, the DPA was used as a worst case scenario that 
should be avoided under all circumstances.83 It is too easy to blame Dayton for all the ills Bosnia 
faces today, but it did lay a foundation based on contradictory frameworks and paradoxical 
provisions. Without finding a common definition of what Bosnia and Herzegovina is as a state, and 
how it can best accommodate the ethnic, religious, cultural and social diversity of the country, it can 
be predicted that there will be little to no progress in Bosnia.    
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